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Abstract 
This paper reconsiders the effect of investor sentiment on stock prices. Using survey-based 
sentiment indicators from Germany and the US we confirm previous findings of predictability 
at intermediate time horizons. The main contribution of our paper is that we also analyze the 
immediate price reaction to the publication of sentiment indicators. We find that the sign of 
the immediate price reaction is the same as that of the predictability at intermediate time 
horizons. This is consistent with sentiment being related to mispricing but is inconsistent with 
the alternative explanation that sentiment indicators provide information about future 
expected returns. 
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Recent empirical research suggests that survey measures of investor sentiment have
the ability to predict future stock returns over the intermediate and long term. The
usual econometric approach is to regress future stock index returns on a sentiment
indicator and appropriate control variables. The aim of using the controls is to
account for variables (such as the term and yield spread) that are already known
to predict future returns. A signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the sentiment indicator is
interpreted as evidence that sentiment predicts future returns.
There are at least two potential explanations for the predictive ability of sentiment
indicators. First, sentiment indices may contain information about future expected
returns that is not already captured by the control variables.1 In this case, the
predictive ability of sentiment indicators does not necessarily imply a violation of
market eﬃciency. Second, sentiment indicators may be related to mispricing (as
proposed by Brown and Cliﬀ (2005) and others). In this case, the predictive power
of sentiment measures provides evidence for a violation of market eﬃciency.
The implications of these two alternative explanations diﬀer markedly. It is thus
very important to discriminate between the ’expected return news’ and ’mispric-
ing’ scenarios. The present paper makes a step in this direction. Our approach
is to simultaneously consider intermediate and long-horizon predictability on the
one hand, and the immediate market reaction to the publication of sentiment in-
dicators on the other. This approach has a simple intuition. Current prices are
inversely related to expected returns. If sentiment indicators contain information
about future expected returns, the sign of the immediate market reaction should
be opposite to that obtained from long-term predictive regressions. If, on the
other hand, sentiment indicators are related to mispricing, we should ﬁnd that
the immediate market reaction has the same sign as that found from predictive
regressions. This is due to the fact that smart investors exploit the information
1Alternatively, sentiment indicators could forecast higher expected future cash ﬂows. In this
case the publication of the sentiment indicator should trigger an immediate price eﬀect (i.e., a
signiﬁcant announcement day return), but should not predict future returns over longer horizons.
The intermediate and long-term predictability reported in previous research is thus inconsistent
with this interpretation. Therefore we only consider the "expected return news" explanation and
confront it with explanations based on mispricing.
1contained in the sentiment indicator. If bullish sentiment predicts positive [neg-
ative] future returns smart investors will buy [sell] and thus cause an immediate
positive [negative] market reaction.2
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to empirically analyze the
immediate response of stock returns to the publication of survey-based sentiment
measures. We use data from Germany and the US. In the ﬁrst part of our analysis
we rely on the methodology proposed by Brown and Cliﬀ (2005). We replicate
their tests for medium and long-term predictability. Consistent with previous
results in the literature, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative relationship between the
sentiment indicator and subsequent medium term (up to three months) index
returns in the US for the earlier parts of our sample period (1987-1994 and, to
a much lesser extent, 1994-2001). This relationship disappears towards the end
of our sample period. In the ﬁnal subperiod (2001-2008), the coeﬃcients of the
predictive regressions are predominantly positive but only weakly signiﬁcant. The
sentiment indicator for the German market is correlated positively with future
returns. This is consistent with the results from the US, because the German
sample covers he years 2001-2008, which is precisely the period for which we also
ﬁnd positive coeﬃcients in the US sample.
In the second step of our analysis, we use event study methodology to test whether
daily index returns respond to the publication of the sentiment indicator. We do
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive announcement day eﬀect in Germany. However, not all
of the predictive power of the indicator is captured on the announcement day. This
pattern is consistent with a scenario of mispricing and of limited arbitrage. Smart
investors are aware of the predictive power of the sentiment indicator and trade
accordingly. However, they do not fully arbitrage the predictability away, possibly
because of increased noise trader risk (as in the model of De Long et al. (1990)).
For the US market there is evidence of a negative publication day eﬀect in the
subperiod 1987-1994. As in the case of Germany this result is consistent with a
scenario of mispricing and limited arbitrage. In later subperiods there is no such
2Of course, with perfect arbitrage we would expect to see only an immediate price reaction.
The stylized fact that sentiment does predict future returns can thus only be reconciled with
mispricing if there are limits to arbitrage.
2eﬀect. This should come as no surprise, because the intermediate- to long-term
predictability also largely disappears towards the end of the sample period.
Our paper is related to previous studies investigating the predictive power of sen-
timent indicators. Brown and Cliﬀ (2004, 2005), Clarke and Statman (1998),
Fisher and Statman (2000), Kaniel et al. (2008), Otoo (1999), Shiller (2000), Solt
and Statman (1988) and Verma et al. (2008) all analyze survey-based sentiment
measures for the US market.3 Although the results are mixed (probably due to
diﬀerences in sample periods, methodology, and the forecasting periods), on bal-
ance these previous studies ﬁnd evidence of long-horizon predictability. Schmeling
(2007) applies a similar methodology to data from the German stock market and
also reports evidence of predictability. Although some papers have tested for short-
term predictability (e.g. at the weekly and monthly level as in Brown and Cliﬀ
(2004)), to our knowledge, the present paper is the ﬁrst to test for announcement
day eﬀects.4
More generally, our paper also relates to previous research testing for return pre-
dictability (see Ang and Bekaert (2007) for a recent contribution). In particular,
certain methodological concerns (the problem of using persistent regressors, ﬁrst
addressed by Stambaugh (1999), and the problem of using overlapping return
data) are also present in our study. We account for these problems by adopting
the bootstrap-based bias correction proposed by Brown and Cliﬀ (2005).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our
data set. In section 3, we present the methodology and results of our tests for
predictability. Section 4 describes our tests for the existence of announcement day
eﬀects. Section 5 concludes.
3A large number of papers uses market-based sentiment measures. These sentiment proxies
include, but are not limited to, mutual fund ﬂows (Brown et al. (2003)), the closed-end fund
discount (Elton et al. (1998), Lee et al. (1991), Neal and Wheatley (1998)), put-call ratios (Dennis
and Mayhew (2002)) and various measures of trading activity (Barber and Odean (2008), Kumar
and Lee (2002, 2006)). Baker and Wurgler (2006) construct a composite sentiment measure
based on six underlying proxies. Brown and Cliﬀ (2004) analyze market-based and survey-based
sentiment measures and conclude that many of these measures are correlated.
4Schmitz et al. (2009) document short-term predictability (one and two days) of a sentiment
measure constructed from data on warrant trades of retail investors. The data used to construct
this measure is, however, not publicly available.
32 Data
2.1 German Data
The analysis of intermediate and long-term predictability is based on weekly data.
We use survey data from Sentix as our measure of investor sentiment. We pre-
fer to use survey-based sentiment indicators over market-based ones because the
publication of the survey results constitutes new information, while market-based
indicators often only aggregate information that were already available.
Sentix conducts weekly surveys of institutional and private investors, and cur-
rently reaches over 2700 registered participants, about 800 of whom take part in
the survey each week. Individual investors constitute on average about 76% of
respondents, with this percentage generally varying between 70% and 80%. Vot-
ing is possible between Thursday afternoon and Saturday. Participants are asked
whether they are bullish, bearish, neutral, or have no opinion with regard to the
future trend of the DAX30 stock index over the following one and six months, re-
spectively. In our analysis we only use data for the six month horizon because the
AAII survey that we use in our US sample is also based on a six months forecasting
horizon.
From the individual opinions obtained, Sentix computes the so-called value index,
also known as the bull-bear spread. This is deﬁned as
St =
#bullish   #bearish
#total
The Sentix index is published every Sunday evening or Monday morning prior to
the opening of the market. It is available to all participants, and additionally, since
January 2004, it has been available trough Thomson DataStream and Bloomberg.
Furthermore, subindices that cover individual and institutional investors, respec-
tively, are made available exclusively to participants.
The Sentix data starts on February 26, 2001 and ends on June 30, 2008. For our
predictive regressions, we use forecasting horizons of 1, 4, 8, 13 and 26 weeks. To
this end, we combine the Sentix data with data on the DAX index for the period
February 26, 2001 to December 31, 2008. The aim of the predictive regressions is
4to test whether the sentiment indicator contains information about future returns
beyond the information inferable from other publicly observable variables. We
therefore control for variables that are known to predict future market returns.
We include the return on the DAX30 for the previous week, the exchange rate
EUR/USD, the interest rate term spread between 10 year German government
bonds and the Euribor 3 month rate, the credit spread (deﬁned as the spread
between yields on A rated corporate bonds of maturities between 3 and 5 years
and the mean of 3 and 5 year German government bond yields5), the liquidity
spread (deﬁned as the spread between the Euribor 3-month and 1-month rates),
and the Euribor 1-month rate.
For the analysis of announcement day eﬀects of the Sentix index, i.e. the test
whether the publication of the sentiment indicator has an immediate price eﬀect,
we use daily data. As the Sentix index is published on the weekend, we consider the
return of the DAX30 between its closing value on Friday and that on Monday. To
this end, we regress daily DAX returns on a variable which is equal to the sentiment
indicator on Mondays and zero on all other days. The regression includes lagged
DAX returns, lagged S&P 500 returns (to account for the fact that respondents
may participate in the survey until Saturday and may therefore base their opinion
on the US stock market return from the previous week) and a Monday dummy (to
control for a weekend eﬀect) as control variables.
Table 1 provides summary statistics of all the variables. The mean of the Sentix
index is 0.12, indicating that the respondents are, on average, slightly bullish. The
mean daily DAX return is very close to zero. The serial and cross correlations
(shown in the last two columns of the table) indicate that the Sentix index is
highly autocorrelated and depends on the previous values of the DAX index. Both
these observations are consistent with the ﬁndings of previous research.
[Table 1 about here.]
5The number of corporate bonds issued by German ﬁrms and rated Aaa and Baa is to small
to reliably estimate the credit spread as the diﬀerence between the yields on Baa-rated and
Aaa-rated corporate bonds (as we do in our US sample). Therefore, we use the yield diﬀerence
between A-rated corporate bonds and government bonds instead.
52.2 US Data
We use data obtained from the American Association of Individual Investors
(AAII). The AAII conducts weekly surveys of its members, the results of which
are published every Thursday6 morning, before the stock market opens. Partic-
ipants are asked whether they expect the direction of the stock market over the
following six months to be ’up’, ’no change’, or ’down’, and can participate once
during every weekly period ranging from Thursday to Wednesday. We use a value
index (bull-bear spread) that is calculated using these data. Our sample covers
more than 20 years. It starts on July 24, 1987 and extends until June 26, 2008.
As Table 2 shows, the mean, standard deviation and ﬁrst order autocorrelation of
the AAII indicator are comparable to those of the German Sentix index.7
[Table 2 about here.]
The AAII survey does not specify which stock index it refers to. We therefore use
the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the Standard & Poors 500, the NASDAQ 100,
and the Russell 3000 indices. We estimate predictive regressions for forecasting
horizons of 1, 4, 8, 13 and 26 weeks. As for the German case, we include other
variables known to have predictive power for market returns as control variables.
We include the same variables as for the German sample but replace the Euribor
rates with Treasury bill rates. Thus, we control for the past week’s return of
the stock index in question, the exchange rate EUR/USD (DM/USD prior to
the introduction of the Euro), the interest rate term spread between 10 year US
Treasury bonds and the Treasury bill 3 month rate, the credit spread (deﬁned as
the yield spread between Baa and Aaa rated corporate bonds), the liquidity spread
6This applies to the period from November 1993 onwards. Before, the day of publication had
been Friday. In case of public holidays, the index is published on the last trading day before that
holiday. In our analysis, we take account of the exact publication days.
7Note that while the AAII index published on Thursday morning is more strongly related
to the S&P return over the previous week (ending on the Wednesday prior to publication) in
comparison to the German data, the relation is signiﬁcant only for the later part of our sample.
This is most likely due to the fact that, until 2000, the AAII survey was conducted by regular
mail. This procedure obviously introduces a lag of several days. We ﬁnd strong support for this
conjecture when we estimate the correlation between the AAII index and the S&P return over
the previous week separately for the period before and after the change in procedure. Prior to
2000 the correlation is 0.010 whereas after 2000 it is 0.287.
6(deﬁned as the spread between the US Treasury bill 3 month and 1 month rates)
and the US Treasury bill 1 month rate.
In the analysis of announcement day returns, we again use daily data. We regress
daily index returns on a variable which is equal to the sentiment indicator on
Thursdays and zero on all other days. The regression includes lagged index returns
and a Monday dummy (to control for a weekend eﬀect) as control variables.
3 Predictive Regressions
3.1 Results for Germany
In this section we analyze whether investor sentiment, measured using the Sentix
survey, is able to predict asset returns for horizons from one to 26 weeks. As
proposed by Brown and Cliﬀ (2005), we use a bootstrap simulation to account
for problems caused by overlapping observations and persistent regressors.8 We
estimate
(rt+1 + ::: + rt+k) = (k) + 
0(k)zt + (k)St + 
(k)
t ; (1)
where rt+k denotes the k week-ahead future DAX log return. (k) is the constant
for a forecasting horizon of k weeks, and zt is a vector of the control variables listed
in section 2.1. St is the value of the long-term Sentix survey. Using the bootstrap
procedure, we obtain coeﬃcient estimates and associated p-values based on the
distribution of the estimated coeﬃcients. Details of the procedure are explained
in the Appendix.
Table 3 shows the results obtained using the procedure described above. It shows
that the aggregate Sentix index, which, on average, consists of roughly three quar-
ters individual and one quarter institutional respondents, has predictive power for
future DAX 30 returns for periods from one to 8 weeks. The bootstrap coeﬃcient
estimates are always larger than the OLS estimates, although the diﬀerences are
small. In spite of their larger numerical values, the bootstrap coeﬃcients have
8Compare also Brown and Cliﬀ (2005), p. 418.
7higher p-values. Our interpretation of the results will be based on the more con-
servative bootstrap procedure.
[Table 3 about here.]
The sign of the relationship between the sentiment indicator and future DAX
returns is positive. From the standard deviation of the Sentix index shown in
Table 1 and the coeﬃcient of the predictive regression shown in Table 3, it follows
that a change of one standard deviation in the Sentix index is associated with
a change in the DAX of almost 2%. over an 8-week horizon. This is not only
statistically, but also economically signiﬁcant.
These results could indicate that the sentiment index foreshadows future misval-
uation. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient in the 26-week predictive regression is the
smallest of all the ﬁve predictive regressions. This pattern is consistent with the
sentiment index indicating a future misvaluation which is subsequently corrected
in the second half of the 26-week prediction period. Alternatively, the sentiment
indicator may contain information on future expected returns. The analysis of the
announcement day eﬀects in section 4.1 will allow us to discriminate between these
interpretations. As previously noted, if the sentiment indicator contains informa-
tion about future expected returns, the announcement day eﬀect should have a
sign opposite to that in the predictive regressions.
3.2 Results for the US
We conduct the same analysis as for the Sentix data for the American Association
of Individual Investors sentiment index. We use the Standard & Poors 500 index
as the index whose return is to be predicted. However, the results are qualitatively
identical for the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the NASDAQ 100, and the Russell
3000 indices. First, we apply our procedure to the whole period from 1987 to 2008.
The results, shown in Table 4, indicate that US individual investor sentiment is
inversely related to future S&P 500 returns. Using the bootstrap results, this
relation is signiﬁcant only for the 26-week ahead forecast. These ﬁndings are con-
sistent with those of Fisher and Statman (2000) and Brown and Cliﬀ (2005). These
8authors also ﬁnd an inverse relationship between sentiment and future returns for
samples covering the periods 1987-1998 and 1963-2000, respectively. Our negative
coeﬃcient is consistent with the sentiment index indicating a current misvaluation
which is subsequently corrected over the forecasting period.
The record of the AAII sentiment index is much longer than that of the Sentix
index. In order to check whether the results are stable over time we split the
AAII data into three subperiods of approximately equal length and apply our
bootstrap procedure to each of these subsamples. The third subsample coincides
with the same period as our German sample. Table 5 shows that the negative
relationship between the AAII index and subsequent returns disappears over time.
It is very pronounced and highly signiﬁcant in the 1987-1994 sample. In the
1994-2001 sample the coeﬃcients retain their sign but are smaller in magnitude
and (at least when considering the bootstrap results) mostly insigniﬁcant. In the
ﬁnal subperiod, most coeﬃcient estimates are positive, and the coeﬃcients for
the one- and four-week horizons are signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. In this
subperiod, then, the results for the US are qualitatively similar to those obtained
for the German case documented in Table 3. We also found coeﬃcients that were
unanimously positive and signiﬁcant for short forecasting horizons in that case.
We can only speculate about the reasons for the change in the predictive ability
of the AAII index over time. One possible explanation is the change in the way
the AAII survey is conducted. Originally, the votes were collected by post which
resulted in a lag of some days. This lag ceased when AAII began to collect the
votes via the internet in 2000. The change in the procedure may also have aﬀected
the composition of the subgroup of AAII members that respond to the survey.
Finally, it is conceivable that the characteristics of the AAII members themselves
have changed over time.
As noted above, for the period 2001 - 2008 we ﬁnd positive coeﬃcients in the
predictive regressions both for Germany and the US. Although the signs of the
coeﬃcients are similar for the two countries, their magnitude is not. Consider
the 8-week forecasting period as an example. As noted in the previous section
a change of one standard deviation in the Sentix index is associated with a 2%
9change in the DAX over an 8-week horizon. The corresponding ﬁgure for the US
is less than 0.5%. It thus appears that the predictive power of the Sentix index
is stronger than that of the AAII index. This may be due to diﬀerences in the
populations of the respective participants. The Sentix index is much younger than
the AAII survey and is much less well known to the general public. Participants in
the Sentix survey are likely to be active traders with a strong interest in ﬁnancial
markets. This may not be generally true for respondents to the AAII survey.9
[Table 4 about here.]
[Table 5 about here.]
4 Announcement Day Eﬀects
4.1 Results for Germany
Having established that the German investor sentiment survey Sentix is indeed
able to predict the future movements in the DAX index, we now test whether the
market reacts to the publication of the sentiment indicator. To this end, we regress
daily DAX log returns rDAX
t 1;t on their ﬁrst lag10 and on the variable Sentimentt
which captures the information content of the sentiment indicator. Because the
Sentix index is published on Sunday evenings or on Monday mornings prior to the
start of trading, the variable Sentimentt is non-zero on Mondays and zero from
Tuesdays to Fridays.
Respondents to the German survey can submit their statement after observing
the closing prices on the US stock market. We therefore include the lagged log
9To shed more light on the diﬀerences between the Sentix and AAII indices we related them
to the time series of ﬂows into mutual funds (results are omitted from the paper). The results
indicate that the AAII index is highly positively correlated to net ﬂows into equity funds while
there is no signiﬁcant relation for the Sentix index.
10The DAX index is calculated from the prices in Xetra, the by far most liquid market for
German stocks. Until November 2003 trading in Xetra closed at 8 p.m. Since then, however,
trading in Xetra closes at 5.30 p.m. while trading on the ﬂoor of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange
(which coexists with Xetra) continues until 8 p.m. When survey respondents submit their opinion
during the week end they know the prices from ﬂoor trading. Therefore, from November 2003
onwards, the lagged DAX return included on the right-hand side is the return of an index called
Late DAX. It is based on the same formula and weighting scheme as the DAX but uses the prices
from the ﬂoor of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.
10returns of the S&P 500 index, rS&P500
t 2;t 1in our regression.11 Finally, we include a
Monday dummy 1Mondayt in order to capture possible day-of-the-week eﬀects. For
daily returns, problems induced by serial correlation are not an issue. However,
the pattern of OLS residuals indicates strong ARCH eﬀects, for which we account
by specifying a GARCH(1,1) model. We estimate the following equations12:
r
DAX
t 1;t = a0 + a1Sentimentt + a2r
DAX
t 2;t 1 + a3r
S&P500
t 2;t 1 + a41Mondayt + et (2)

2
t = b0 + b1e
2
t 1 + b2
2
t 1:
We estimate three speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst, sentiment is measured as the level
of the Sentix value index. The second speciﬁcation includes the change in the
value index rather than its level. The third speciﬁcation only uses the unexpected
change in the value index. We obtain the unexpected change by ﬁrst regressing the
sentiment index on its own lagged values and lagged DAX and S&P 500 returns
and then using the residuals from this regression This procedure is implemented
using expanding windows. Thus, the ﬁrst-pass regression used to identify the
unexpected component of the sentiment index only uses information available at
time (t-1).13 Results are presented in table 6.
[Table 6 about here.]
We ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant announcement day eﬀect irrespective of the
speciﬁcation used. Thus, all three sentiment variables are signiﬁcantly positively
correlated to daily closing log returns. Hence, the market appears to react to the
publication of the investor sentiment index. The DAX increases after a rise and
decreases after a fall in the sentiment indicator. Lagged index returns are also
11If we omitted the lagged S&P500 returns, the sentiment indicator could be signiﬁcant merely
due to the possibility that it serves as a proxy for the US stock returns after the close of trading
in Germany.
12As mentioned previously the Sentix index is published on Sunday evening or Monday morning
prior to the opening of the market (time index t). We analyze whether the publication of the
Sentix index aﬀects the DAX return from Friday’s close (time t-1) to Monday’s close (t).
13We use the data for 2001 to initialize the procedure. The ﬁrst observations included in the
second-pass regression are those for January 2002. Therefore, the number of observations in
model 3 is lower than in models 1 and 2.
11signiﬁcant, while we ﬁnd no clear evidence in favor of a Monday eﬀect on the
German stock market.
The announcement day eﬀect is positive and thus has the same sign as the intermediate-
term predictability documented in section 3.1. This ﬁnding is inconsistent with
the idea that the sentiment indicator provides information about future expected
returns. If it did, we would expect the announcement day eﬀect to have the op-
posite sign to that found in the predictive regressions for the intermediate term.
Our results thus support a misvaluation interpretation of the predictive power of
sentiment indicators.
4.2 Results for the US
We conduct a similar analysis to that described above for the AAII sentiment sur-
vey.14 Remember from section 3.2 that we found negative, but mostly insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcients in the predictive regressions over the full sample period. Consistent
with this result, the ﬁrst panel of table 7 shows that, for the whole period, there
is no signiﬁcant announcement eﬀect on the day the AAII sentiment is published.
By considering the three sub-samples, we ﬁnd results that mirror those of the
predictive regressions shown in table 5. The publication of the sentiment index
triggers a negative announcement day eﬀect in the ﬁrst subsample. The respec-
tive coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant (at the 10% level or better) in two out of the three
speciﬁcations. We do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant announcement day eﬀect for the later
subsamples. This is not surprising because the predictive regressions presented
earlier led to the conclusion that the AAII index is largely unrelated to future
returns in these subperiods.
The announcement day eﬀect in the ﬁrst sub-period has the same sign as that of
the coeﬃcients in the predictive regressions. The results for the US, like those for
Germany, are thus inconsistent with the expected return news scenario. Rather,
they support the interpretation that investor sentiment is related to misvaluation.
[Table 7 about here.]
14Model 3 again uses a expanding-window procedure. The ﬁrst year of data (July 1987 - June
1988) is used to initialize the procedure, the analysis of the announcement day eﬀects starts in
July 1988.
125 Conclusion
If sentiment indicators predict future stock market returns over the intermediate
and long term (as is suggested by previous empirical research), smart traders can be
expected to exploit the information conveyed by the indicator and thus trigger an
immediate market response to the publication of the sentiment indicator. The sign
of the immediate price reaction will then be the same as that of the intermediate
and long-term predictability. If, on the other hand, sentiment indicators provide
new information about future expected returns, the sign of the immediate price
reaction will be opposite to that of the intermediate and long-term predictability.
The present paper is the ﬁrst to empirically analyze whether an immediate market
reaction can be identiﬁed in the data, and whether the sign of such a reaction
corresponds to the sign of the intermediate and long-term predictive ability. In
order to investigate these matters, we use survey-based sentiment indicators from
the US (the AAII sentiment index) and for Germany (the Sentix index). In a ﬁrst
step, we replicate earlier results showing that the sentiment indicators do indeed
have predictive power for future stock market returns over the intermediate term.
We further document that the predictive power of the AAII index has largely
disappeared in recent years.
In the second step of our analysis, we use event study methodology to test whether
the daily index returns respond to the publication of the sentiment indicator. We
do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive announcement day eﬀect in Germany. This pattern is
consistent with mispricing and limited arbitrage. Smart investors are aware of the
predictive power of the sentiment indicator and trade accordingly. However, they
do not fully arbitrage the predictability away, possibly because of increased noise
trader risk (as in the model of de Long et al. (1990)). For the US market, there
is evidence of a negative publication day eﬀect in the subperiod 1987-1994. As for
the German case, this result is consistent with the mispricing scenario and limited
arbitrage. In later subperiods, there is no signiﬁcant publication day eﬀect. This is
unsurprising, because the intermediate to long-term predictability also disappears
towards the end of the sample period.
Notwithstanding the diﬀerences between the results for Germany and the US , the
13results for the two countries share one characteristic. They are both consistent with
a mispricing interpretation of the predictive power of sentiment and inconsistent
with the hypothesis that the sentiment indicator contains information about future
expected returns.
Appendix
Similar to Brown and Cliﬀ (2005), we regress future k-week returns on the current
value of the sentiment index and control variables
(rt+1 + ::: + rt+k) = (k) + 
0(k)zt + (k)St + 
(k)
t ;
where the variables are deﬁned as in section 3.1. The fact that we use overlapping
observations for the regressand induces an MA(k 1) structure in the error terms
under the null hypothesis that (1) is serially uncorrelated. Since robust standard
errors, suggested by Hansen and Hodrick (1980), are known to perform poorly
in small samples and the existence of persistent regressors leads to a bias in the
coeﬃcient estimates, we opt for a simulation approach to account for the bias and
to obtain appropriate critical values for inference.
We replicate the bootstrap simulation of Brown and Cliﬀ (2005), pp. 437, and
start by estimating a VAR(1) model for yt = [rtStz0
t]. After the estimation, we
impose the null hypothesis that the Sentix sentiment survey does not predict 1-
week returns, by setting the appropriate element in the coeﬃcient vector of the
return equation equal to zero. We then adjust the constant in the constrained
model by adding the contribution of average sentiment to the returns obtained
by multiplying the original slope value of the sentiment by the average sentiment
level to the constant of the return equation. We bootstrap the residuals from the
calibration estimates to account for heteroscedasticity, and generate and discard
100 additional observations to delete possible starting eﬀects. In each of the repli-
cations, a number equal to our original sample of simulated observations is used
to estimate our equation of interest for horizons from one to 26 weeks. Analogous
to Brown and Cliﬀ, we repeat the procedure 10,000 times in order to obtain a
14distribution of the values of ^ (k).
In order to gauge the statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient estimates we com-
pare the sentiment coeﬃcient of the original model with the simulated probability
distribution in order to obtain p-values. Because these p-values are based on the
actual distribution of the residuals, they are robust to deviations from the normal
distribution.
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18Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics of German data
Mean Std. Dev. i s;i
Sentixt 0.121 0.113 0.773 1.000
Sentixt -0.000 0.067 -0.301 0.335
InnoSentixt 0.002 0.058 0.070 0.726
rDAX
t 2;t 1 0.000 0.032 0.016 0.048
rS&P500
t 2;t 1 0.000 0.022 -0.054 0.007
EUR/USDt 1 1.185 0.187 0.988 0.029
Term Spreadt 1 0.011 0.008 0.986 -0.107
Credit Spreadt 1 0.011 0.003 0.946 -0.243
Liquidity Spreadt 1 0.001 0.001 0.937 0.112
Euribor 1mt 1 0.031 0.009 0.990 -0.025
The table presents summary statistics for the German data. All returns are from Friday
close to the next Friday close. Other control variables (the EUR/USD exchange rate,
the term, credit and liquidity spread and the Euribor 1-month rate) are from Friday.
The Sentix index is published on Sunday evenings or Monday mornings. Sentixt denotes
the index level, Sentixt denotes its weekly change, and InnoSentixt the unexpected
component of the index (the residual of a linear regression of the index on its lagged
value and the lagged DAX return). i denotes the ﬁrst-order serial correlation of variable
i, s;i denotes the correlation between the Sentix index and variable i.
19Table 2: Summary Statistics of US data
Mean Std. Dev. i s;i
AAIIt 0.099 0.188 0.670 1.000
AAIIt -0.001 0.152 -0.343 0.400
InnoAAIIt 0.008 0.135 -0.144 0.738
rS&P500
t 2;t 1 0.001 0.021 -0.053 0.134
USD/EURt 1 1.168 0.149 0.990 -0.198
Term Spreadt 1 0.017 0.012 0.992 0.026
Credit Spreadt 1 0.009 0.002 0.979 -0.202
Liquidity Spreadt 1 0.027 0.012 0.989 -0.132
Treasury bill 1mt 1 0.017 0.008 0.988 -0.152
The table presents summary statistics for the US data. All returns are for the week
prior to the publication of the AAII index. Other control variables (the USD/EUR
exchange rate, the term, credit and liquidity spread and the 1-month T-bill rate) are
from Wednesdays. The AAII index is published on Thursday morning. AAIIt denotes the
index level, AAIIt denotes its weekly change, and InnoAAIIt the unexpected component
of the index (the residual of a regression of the index on its lagged value and the lagged
S&P return). i denotes the ﬁrst-order serial correlation of variable i, s;i denotes the
correlation between the AAII index and variable i.
20Table 3: Sentiment Coeﬃcient in k-Week Regressions for Aggregate 6 Month DAX
Sentiment
Reg. Horizon OLS Bootstrap
^ OLS Sig. level ~ SIM Sig. level
1 week 0.0395 0.011 0.0403 0.036
4 weeks 0.1101 0.000 0.1156 0.049
8 weeks 0.1783 0.000 0.1887 0.041
13 weeks 0.1337 0.000 0.1519 0.194
26 weeks -0.0455 0.712 -0.0179 0.958
The table presents the  coeﬃcients of equation (rt+1 + ::: + rt+k) = (k) + 0(k)zt +
(k)St+
(k)
t obtained from OLS estimation (columns 1 and 2) and bootstrap simulations
as explained in the appendix (columns 3 and 4). Results are presented for forecasting
horizons of k = 1;4;8;13; 26 weeks. The control variables are listed in section 2.1. ,
 and  denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
21Table 4: Sentiment Coeﬃcient in k-Week Regressions for AAII Sentiment and S&P
500
Reg. Horizon OLS Bootstrap
^ OLS Sig. level ~ SIM Sig. level
1 week 0.0024 0.810 0.0029 0.371
4 weeks -0.0159 0.002 -0.0142 0.264
8 weeks -0.0252 0.000 -0.0223 0.273
13 weeks -0.0433 0.000 -0.0389 0.129
26 weeks -0.0729 0.000 -0.0651 0.076
The table presents the  coeﬃcients of equation (rt+1 + ::: + rt+k) = (k) + 0(k)zt +
(k)St+
(k)
t obtained from OLS estimation (columns 1 and 2) and bootstrap simulations
as explained in the Appendix (columns 3 and 4). Results are presented for periods of
k = 1;4;8;13;26 weeks. The control variables are listed in section 2.2.   ,  and 
denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
22Table 5: Sentiment Coeﬃcient in k-Week Regressions for AAII Sentiment and S&P
500 - Subperiods
07/1987 to 06/1994
Reg. Horizon OLS Bootstrap
^ OLS Sig. level ~ SIM Sig. level
1 week -0.0054 0.090 -0.0042 0.662
4 weeks -0.0526 0.000 -0.0470 0.045
8 weeks -0.0699 0.000 -0.0586 0.145
13 weeks -0.1158 0.000 -0.0974 0.058
26 weeks -0.1746 0.000 -0.1439 0.052
07/1994 to 01/2001
Reg. Horizon OLS Bootstrap
^ OLS Sig. level ~ SIM Sig. level
1 week -0.0015 0.827 -0.0004 0.926
4 weeks -0.0520 0.000 -0.0475 0.047
8 weeks -0.0550 0.009 -0.0466 0.241
13 weeks -0.0618 0.022 -0.0481 0.408
26 weeks -0.1118 0.000 -0.0880 0.252
02/2001 to 06/2008
Reg. Horizon OLS Bootstrap
^ OLS (t-stat.) ~ SIM Sig. level
1 week 0.0100 0.338 0.0111 0.049
4 weeks 0.0219 0.458 0.0252 0.078
8 weeks 0.0200 0.897 0.0257 0.189
13 weeks 0.0168 0.308 0.0250 0.267
26 weeks -0.0182 0.000 -0.0047 0.804
The table presents the  coeﬃcients of equation (rt+1 + ::: + rt+k) = (k) + 0(k)zt +
(k)St+
(k)
t obtained from OLS estimation (columns 1 and 2) and bootstrap simulations
as explained in the Appendix (columns 3 and 4). Results are presented for periods of
k = 1;4;8;13;26 weeks. The control variables are listed in section 2.2.   ,  and 
denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
23Table 6: Estimation Results for Daily DAX Log Returns of Closing Prices
Speciﬁcation (1) (2) (3)
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Variable (jt   stat:j) (jt   stat:j) (jt   stat:j)
Sentixt 0.012
(2.12)
Sentixt 0.025
(2.52)
InnoSentixt 0.025
(2.30)
rDAX
t 2;t 1 -0.166 -0.166 -0.182
(5.98) (5.83) (5.99)
rS&P500
t 2;t 1 0.285 0.287 0.289
(8.91) (8.51) (8.05)
1Mondayt -0.001 7e-04 3e-04
(1.27) (1.14) (0.51)
Const: 6e-04 6e-04 7e-04
(2.33) (2.32) (2.52)
Obs: 1,916 1,911 1,695
Adj:R2 0.033 0.034 0.035
The table shows the results of a GARCH(1,1) with mean equation rDAX
t 1;t = a0 +
a1Sentimentt + a2rDAX
t 2;t 1 + a3rS&P500
t 2;t 1 + a41Mondayt + et. rDAX
t 1;t is the return on the
DAX index, rS&P500
t 2;t 1 is the return on the S&P 500 index, Sentimentt is equal to our
sentiment measure on Mondays and zero else, and 1Mondayt is a dummy variable that is
set to one on Mondays. We use three sentiment measures, the level of the Sentix index
(column 1), the ﬁrst diﬀerence (column 2) and the residual from a regression of the Sentix
index on its lagged value and the lagged DAX and S&P 500 returns (column 3). ***, **
and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
24Table 7: Estimation Results for Daily S&P 500 Log Returns of Closing Prices
07/1987 to 06/2008 07/1987 to 06/1994
Speciﬁcation (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Variable (jt   stat:j) (jt   stat:j) (jt   stat:j) (jt   stat:j) (jt   stat:j) (jt   stat:j)
AAIIt 0.000 -0.005
(0.17) (2.43)
AAIIt -0.001 -0.003
(0.77) (1.23)
InnoAAIIt -0.000 -0.004
(0.06) (1.71)
rS&P500
t 2;t 1 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 0.006 0.003 0.011
(0.43) (0.48) (0.47) (0.20) (0.10) (0.46)
1Mondayt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.15) (1.17) (1.40) (1.22) (1.33) (2.18)
Const: 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(3.50) (3.63) (3.06) (1.58) (1.28) (0.42)
07/1994 to 01/2001 02/2001 to 06/2008
Speciﬁcation (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Variable (jt   stat:j) (jt   stat:j) (jt   stat:j) (jt   stat:j) (jt   stat:j) (jt   stat:j)
AAIIt -0.001 0.002
(0.31) (0.86)
AAIIt 0.002 -0.001
(0.54) (0.49)
InnoAAIIt 0.001 0.001
(0.24) (0.30)
rS&P500
t 2;t 1 0.041 0.041 0.041 -0.061 -0.061 -0.061
(1.53) (1.54) (1.54) (2.40) (2.40) (2.39)
1Mondayt -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.62) (0.60) (0.58) (0.58) (0.44) (0.44)
Const: 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(4.04) (4.32) (4.23) (0.98) (1.28) (1.28)
The table shows the results of a GARCH(1,1) with mean equation rS&P500
t 1;t = a0 +
a1Sentimentt + a2rS&P500
t 2;t 1 + a31Mondayt + et. rS&P500
t 1;t is the return on the S&P 500
index, Sentimentt is equal to our sentiment measure on Thursdays and zero else, and
1Mondayt is a dummy variable that is set to one on Mondays. We use three sentiment
measures, the level of the AAII index (column 1), the ﬁrst diﬀerence (column 2) and
the residual from a regression of the AAII index on its lagged value and the lagged S&P
500 return (column 3). ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
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